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Introduction
Many parents worry when their child leaves for a few days or
travels far from home. But imagine if your child were taken to a country
15,000 miles away and kept away for years, or even forever. Thousands
of parents are now living this nightmare - more than 10,000 American
" J.D., 2004, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Staff Attorney,
Immigrant Justice Project, Legal Services of Southern Piedmont.
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children are abducted to a foreign country each year.1 For the parents
left behind after an international child abduction, each morning brings
another day of worry, anxiety and a faint hope that they will see their
child again. International parental abductions have become an epidemic
in today's world.2 Thousands of children are kidnapped and taken to
foreign countries by a parent or close family member.3 Many of these
abductions arise during custody disputes or divorce proceedings.4 Due to
the recent increase in transnational marriages and advances in personal
mobility, a parent is more likely, and able, to take his or her child to
another country after a divorce or estrangement.5
Traditionally, the parents who are left behind after an
international kidnapping faced nearly insurmountable hurdles in order to
get their child back. Parents were forced to navigate an unfamiliar, often
hostile, legal system that was drafted in a foreign language and derived
from a foreign culture. Often, a parent had no guarantee that the foreign
country would act to return their children.6 In addition, international
parental abductions generally are not criminal acts under foreign law and
thus carry no legal sanction.' Because courts viewed parental
' See Susan Mackie, Comment: Procedural Problems in the Adjudication of
International Parental Child Abduction, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 445, 446
(1996) (citing statistics stating that of the 350,000 child abductions that occur
each year, more than 10,000 involve American children held in foreign countries
by a parent).
2 See Rania Nanos, The Views of a Child: Emerging Interpretation and
Significance of the Child's Objection Clause under the Hague Convention
Abduction Convention, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT'L LAW, 437, 437 n. 1 (1996) (citing
statistics showing the soaring rate of child abduction in recent years).
3Id.
4 See Mackie, supra note 1, at 445 (stating that child abductions during divorce
or separation proceedings may result from a desire for sole custody, from a
misguided attempt to reunite the family, or from spite against the aggrieved
parent).
See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2 (P.B. Carter QC ed., Oxford
University Press 1999) (1999) (Citing modem socio-legal and technological
developments, and increased divorce and international marriage rates, as origins
for the growth of international parental abductions).
6 Foreign countries are generally under no legal obligation to enforce child
custody awards granted in another country. Id. at 3.
7Id.
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kidnappings as technically 'legal,' courts were often reluctant to become
involved in returning the child.8
The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction offers
hope to many such parents. The Convention creates a procedure to
promptly return abducted children 9 to their country of habitual residence,
where the national courts can later institute custody proceedings.' ° The
Hague Convention simplifies the often-convoluted process of effecting
return by guaranteeing a simple civil procedure. Under this treaty, a left-
behind parent may file a civil suit against the abducting parent in the
country to which his children were abducted or to a Central Authority. 1
If successful, the courts of the country to which the children were
abducted will order the children returned to their home country.
12
Countries and courts have praised the Convention for providing
the swift return of abducted children,' 3 but it has also come under
increased criticism.14 The Convention requires courts to balance the
child's best safety and welfare interests against the need for swift return.
Many commentators, however, have criticized the Convention for giving
8 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 3 (outlining reasons why parents left behind
after an international parental abduction had very little chance of recovering the
child from a non-Hague Convention foreign country).
9 See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law: Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 1980, 19
I.L.M. 1501 (1980) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
"0 BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 28.
"1 Id.
'
2 1d
"13 See, e.g., Lynda R. Herring, Comment, Taking Away the Pawns: International
Parental Abduction & the Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
137, 140 (1998) (stating that the Hague Convention has proved to be an
effective weapon in deterring child abductions and securing the prompt return of
abducted children).
"4 See generally, e.g., Thomas A. Johnson, The Hague Child Abduction
Convention: Diminishing Returns and Little to Celebrate for Americans, 33
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 125 (2000) (criticizing noncompliance by many
countries, and "blind compliance" to the treaty by the U.S.); Merle H. Weiner,
Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need for Purposive
Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 275 (2002) (criticizing inconsistent
application of treaty provisions).
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insufficient consideration to the best interests of the child.1 5 Typically,
the child's best interest is of paramount importance in most custody
proceedings.' 6 However, under the Hague Convention, the courts are
required to return children promptly, with only a cursory investigation
into whether a return order should be issued.' In this way, the
Convention strives to maintain children's best overall interests by
deterring international abductions. 8 By having a simple, certain rule, the
treaty allows the expeditious handling of child abduction cases, but
sacrifices a degree of judicial discretion and flexibility.' 9
However, the Convention's approach has created a possible
tension between protecting a child's individual interests and the treaty's
overall interest in preventing abductions; a tension that has not fully been
resolved. This tension has become even more evident in recent years as
developments such as the Children's Rights Convention2 0 and domestic
violence treatises2' call for even more consideration of children's
15 See, e.g. Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications
of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction, 20 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 672 (2001) (criticizing court's narrow
interpretation of defenses to return under the Hague Convention, and arguing for
a broader interpretation of treaty provisions to better protect the best interests of
abducted children),
16 See Brian S. Kenworthy, Note: The Un-Common Law: Emerging Differences
Between the United States and the United Kingdom on the Children's Rights
Aspects of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 12
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 347 (2002) (stating that "U.S. courts often use
the 'best interests' standards in resolving many domestic law custody disputes").
17 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 28, 29 (emphasizing the Convention's
change from the traditional approach used in abduction proceedings; the primary
goal is no longer a detailed investigation of the best interests of the child, but
rather a preemptory exam into whether a return order should be issued).
18 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 29 (stating that the Convention seeks to
further the interests of children collectively by promptly returning wrongfully
removed children).
'9 Id. at 30.
20 See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., 61st plen. mtg. at art. 12, 1577 U.N.T.S. This treaty requires nations to
recognize the human rights of children, including the right to have their views
heard and considered in custody proceedings.
21 See, e.g. Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape
From Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L .REV. 593, 662-63 (2000) (arguing
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individual rights and wishes in legal proceedings. Nowhere is this
tension between individual rights and collective interests more evident
than in the Hague Convention's Child's Objection Clause.
The Child's Objection Clause allows a court to consider the
objection of an abducted child of sufficient age and maturity to being
returned to the country of his habitual residence after an international
abduction.22 If successful, this clause allows the child to stay in the
country to which he was abducted23 and prevents the child's return to his
habitual residence. 24 The Clause, controversial since its inception,25 has
become even more divisive, with some commentators calling for a
broader interpretation,26 while others call for its complete revocation.27
Meanwhile, different countries and judges have interpreted the Clause in
wildly varying ways, creating a situation that is at best, uncertain, and at
worst, chaotic.
Given the countervailing policy interests and contradictory case
law, how much weight should judges give to a child's objection? This
article will examine how American courts have interpreted the Child's
Objection Clause in the past and consider the policy reasons for both
narrow and broad interpretations of the provision. Finally, this article
will argue for a more structured analysis to promote a uniform
consideration of these policy objectives.
Part I will concentrate generally on the Hague Convention with
an overview of the treaty's provisions and the history behind its
that courts should be more open to considering the child's preference when he or
she expresses the desire to stay with a parent who is a victim of domestic
violence, due to the child's possible fear of the other parent).
22 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions,
Oct. 25, 1980, art. 13(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 177 (stating that "the debates surrounding
Art. 13(b) [the Child's Objection Clause] were without doubt among the most
divisive of the [conference] session").
26 See Kenworthy, e.g. supra note 16.
27 See Brenda J. Shirman, International Treatment of Child Abduction and the
1980 Hague Convention, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 188, 219 (1991)
(arguing that the exception allowing deference to the child's wishes should be
removed to eliminate the possibility of undue influence by the abducting parent).
Fall 2005
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
inception. Part H of this note concentrates specifically on the Child's
Objection Clause and reviews the legislative history of this clause, and
United States case law interpreting this provision. Part fII examines the
various policy arguments for and against the current interpretation of
the Child's Objection Clause and evaluates whether those policy
interests are adequately considered under the current system. Finally,
Part IV concentrates specifically on how the courts can more effectively
consider children's objections in order to further both children's rights
and the objectives of the Hague Convention.
I. Hague Convention on International Child Abduction
A. Overview of the Adoption of and Policies behind the
Treaty
For many parents, getting their child back after an international
abduction becomes a nightmarish ordeal; parents left behind normally
need to take their case to the country in which the abductor lives in order
to get their child back.28 This often led to nearly insurmountable hurdles
of time, distance, and cultural barriers that made it difficult to obtain an
order returning the child.2 9 Therefore, when one parent abducted a child
to a foreign country, that parent received a legal advantage and an
inherently favorable forum for legal and custody proceedings. 0
Signatory nations adopted the Hague Convention primarily to curtail the
28 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 3.
29 See id. (stating that "[i]t is clear that prior to the entry in force of the Hague
Convention ... there were very limited chances of recovering an abducted
child".)
30 See Explanatory Report of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child
Abduction, Elisa Perez-Vera, Acts and Documents of the XIVth Session,
Volume I, 1982, 426, at 429, 13,14 [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report] (stating
that "the person who removes the child.. .hopes to obtain the right of custody
from the authorities of the country to which the child has been taken ... the
abductor will hold the advantage, since it is he who has chosen the forum in
which the case is to be decided... [which] he regards as more favorable to his
own claims"). Ms. Perez-Vera is the official reporter for the Hague Convention,
and her report is considered to be "the official history and commentary on the
Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of provisions." Text
and Legal Analysis of the Hague International Child Abduction Convention, 51
Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,506 (1986).
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tide of international parental abductions by removing the jurisdictional
advantages received by a parent who abducts his or her child.31
The Hague Convention creates a simpler and more effective
procedure to solve and deter international child abductions.32 The
Convention allows left-behind parents to seek the immediate return of
their abducted children to their country of habitual residence, barring
certain narrow exceptions.3 3  Hague Convention cases are civil
proceedings that the left-behind parent institutes, either in the country to
which the abducted child was taken, or by filing with a Central Authority
of the Hague Convention.3 4 This court-ordered return is not a decision
31 See also Perez-Vera Report at 429, 16. (stating that the Convention acts to
deter abductions by depriving the abductor of any of practical or jurisdictional
benefits). The Hague Convention is limited in scope to abductions by a parent,
guardian, or a close relative. Abductions by a third-party or stranger are
generally regarded as a criminal matter to be dealt with by the criminal justice
system, while abductions by a family member are most often treated as civil
matters. BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 1.
32 See Public Notice 957, Hague International Child Abduction Convention;
Text and Legal Analysis by the Dept. of State, 51 Fed. Reg. 10493, 10496
(1986) [hereinafter Text and Legal Analysis] (discussing how implementation
of the Hague Convention procedures will deter future international abductions).
33 See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abductions, Oct. 25, 1980, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89
[hereinafter Hague Convention] (stating that "[t]he objects of the present
Convention are - a[.] to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully
removed to or retained in any Contracting State"). See also Hague Conference
on Private International Law: Final Act, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501. See also
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 429, 16 ("The Convention ... places at
the head of its objectives the restoration of the status quo, by means of 'the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
State"'). For a discussion of defenses preventing return, see infra Part I(B)(2).
34 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 428-29, 13, 14. The Hague
Convention requires that all signatory countries maintain a Central Authority
office. Herring, supra note 13, at 150. The Central Authority acts to facilitate
parental abduction proceedings, locate abducted children, and provide legal
information and counsel. Id. Under Art. 8 of the treaty, a petitioning parent
may choose to file either in the abducted-to nation, or the Central Authority of
his or her own country. If filed in the petitioning parent's own Central
Authority, the petition is then forwarded to the Central Authority of the
abducted-to nation. Id.
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on the merits of any parental custody dispute or a determination of the
best interests of the child. Instead, actual child custody proceedings
begin once the child is returned to his or her country of habitual
residence.3 5 Thus, the Convention removes the incentive for parents to
remove the child to another country with a more favorable legal system
in order to obtain custody.36
The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction was
adopted in 1980 by a unanimous vote of states present at the
conference,37 and entered into force in 1983 after France, Portugal, and
Canada ratified the treaty.38 Although the United States signed the treaty
in 1981, 39 the treaty did not become law in the U.S. until the passage of
35 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 430, 9. (stating that the
Convention's emphasis on prompt removal will allow a final decision on the
merits of a custody case to be made in the child's country of habitual residence).
Article 19 of the Hague Convention also makes clear that Hague proceedings are
not meant to be a determination on the merits of custody claims. Hague
Convention, supra note 33, art. 19., T.I.A.S. at 11,672, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 91. The
court in the abducted-to nation decides merits of the abduction claim only. See
id. It is not within the power of the court to make a final determination of
custody. See Hague Convention, art. 16, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 101.
36 See Hague Convention, supra note 33, at page 1.
37 The conference participants at the Hague's Fourteenth Session on Private
Intemational Law included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 426, 1.
38 Text and Legal Analysis, Oct. 5, 1985, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10496 (March 25,
1986).
39 Id.
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the International Child Abduction and Recovery Act in 1988.40 The
Convention is now in force in sixty-eight countries.
4 1
The treaty applies only to abductions to a Contracting State;
42
abductions to a non-Contracting state are instead handled according to
the domestic laws of that country. The treaty does not deal with an
abduction's criminal aspects, instead it sets the guidelines for recovering
the abducted children via a civil lawsuit.43
B. Making a Case under the Hague Convention
1. Prima Facie Case for Return
If one parent abducts his or her child to a signatory country of
the Hague Convention, the parent left behind may file a civil action for
40 See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601-11610
(1994). [hereinafter ICARA]. See generally The International Child Abduction
Act, Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law
and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988)
(hearing before Congress in which numerous international law experts and
groups testify in favor of approving the act).
4' The Hague Convention applies in the following countries: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark (except the Faroe Islands and
Greenland), Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 332, n.22.
42 For the Hague Convention to apply, the child must be a resident of a signatory
country, and abducted to another signatory country. If either of these criteria is
not met, the Hague Convention will not apply, and a left-behind parent may not
file a civil suit under the terms of the Convention. See June Starr, The Global
Battlefield.- Culture and International Child Custody Disputes at the Century's
End, 15 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 791, 797 (1998).
43 Herring, supra note 13, at 140 n. 12 ("Although "abduction" typically appears
in the criminal context, the Convention deals only with the civil issues arising
from international child abduction.")
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the child's immediate return. 4 In order to receive a return order, the
petitioning parent must first meet the elements of a prima facie case of
wrongful removal. 45 To establish a prima facie case, the party must
show: 1) "Habitual residence" - that the child was a habitual resident of
the country from which he or she was abducted;46 2) "custody rights" -
that the petitioning parent had custody rights over the child; and 3)
"wrongful removal" - that the child was removed from his "habitual
residence" in breach of the petitioning parent's custody rights, which that
parent was exercising at the time of the removal.47 In addition, the
Convention only applies if the abducted child is less than sixteen years
old.48 If the petitioning parent proves these elements, the child's return is
mandatory unless the abducting parent proves an affirmative defense.49
In the United States, the petitioning party has the burden of proof
and must prove the "wrongful removal" elements by a "preponderance of
the evidence. 5 ° Once the petitioning parent has satisfied these criteria,
the prima facie case allows for return of the child. Once the parent
makes a prima facie case, the child's return is mandatory under the terms
of Article 12,51 unless the wrongful abductor can prove certain narrow
defenses or exceptions.5 ' The burden of proof shifts to the responding
party to prove an affirmative defense or exception preventing return.53
44 Text and Legal Analysis, supra note 30, at 10,507.
45 Hon. James D. Garbolino, INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY CASES:
HANDLING HAGUE CONVENTION CASES IN U.S. COURTS 85 (3rd. ed. 2000)
46 Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 4.
47 Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 3.
48 See Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 4. ("The Convention shall cease to
apply when the child attains the age of [sixteen] years.").
49 Id.
50 See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §
11603(e)(2)(A)(b) (2002).
51 See Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 12 ("Where a child has been
wrongfully removed or retained ... the authority concerned shall order the return
of the child forthwith.")
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A)(b). For a discussion of defenses that may
prevent return, see infra Part I(B)(2).
53 ,7
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2. Overview of Defenses and Exceptions Limiting
Return of the Child in Hague Convention
Proceedings
Although the Hague Convention seeks the swift return of
children to their habitual residence, the treaty does allow for several
defenses that, if successful, will prevent the child's return.5" These
defenses must be constructed narrowly, in keeping with the Convention's
main goals of prompt return and judicial compliance with the treaty's
terms.55
The Convention lists six defenses that will prevent a child from
being returned. Four "defenses" deal with general conditions that may
stop the court from returning a child. First, Art. 12 states that the court
may refuse return if more than a year has passed and the child is already
"well-settled" in his new environment.5 6 The court may also refuse
return under Art. 20 if returning the child would violate "fundamental
principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms" of the requested
country. 7 Finally, if the petitioning parent had actually consented to or
acquiesced to the child's removal, the court may determine that the
removal was not actually "wrongful" and therefore not in violation of the
treaty.5 8 In addition to these defenses, the Hague Convention also has
two defenses to return that are based specifically on the child's best
54 See Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress:
The Need for Purposeful Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 275, 302
(outlining exceptions and affirmative defenses to the remedy of return).
55 See Text and Legal Analysis, supra note 32, at 10,510 (1986) (stating that
conference participants believed courts would narrowly construe the exceptions,
and allowing their use only in clearly meritorious cases). See also Perez-Vera
Report, supra note 30, at 434-35
56 Hague Convention, supra note 33, Art. 12.
57 Hague Convention, supra note 33, Art. 20. However, this clause has rarely
been invoked. The Lowe study of Hague cases found that courts have never
decided to refuse return based on an Art. 20 defense. Lowe, Statistical Analysis,
supra note 6, at 16-17. As Beaumont comments, the defense appears to have
"disappeared without a trace" from Hague proceedings. BEAUMONT, supra note
5, at 172.
58 See Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 13(a).
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interests and wishes: the Art. 13(b) "grave risk of harm" defense and the
Art. 13(2) "child's objection" to return. 59
Article 13(b) is the most commonly used exception in Hague
Convention cases.6° Under Article 13(b), the court may refuse to return
the child if the respondent establishes that returning the child would
place him or her in "grave risk of psychological or physical harm" or an
"intolerable situation. 61  However, as with the previous defenses, the
judge retains a degree of discretion, and may still order the child's return
even if a 13(b) defense is established.62
Despite, or perhaps because of, Article 13(b)'s wide use in
Convention actions, the defense has been heavily criticized by many
commentators.63 Many have criticized the courts' strict interpretation of
the defense, 64 while others have argued that even stricter restrictions are
needed to prevent the defense from overwhelming the principal
objectives of the Convention. 65  This clause, like the Children's
59 Id. at Art. 13(b) and Art. 13(2).
60 Nelson, supra note 15, at 676.
61 See Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 13(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8,
1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
62 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 460, 113. The Report explains that
" it is appropriate to emphasize that the exceptions in these two articles do not
apply automatically, in that they do not invariably result in the child's retention;
nevertheless, the very nature of these exceptions gives judges a discretion - and
does not impose upon them a duty - to refuse to return a child in certain
circumstances."
63 Id.
64 See generally Nelson, supra note 15 (analyzing criteria required to prove
"grave risk" in U.S. courts and arguing that courts must expand the definition
and interpretation of this clause in order to safeguard children's interests);
Weiner, supra note 13 (arguing that strict interpretation of the 13(b) defense
does not sufficiently protect abductors and children who are victims of domestic
violence).
65 See, e.g. Gary Zalkin, The Increasing Incidence of American Courts Allowing
Abducting Parents to Use the Article 13(b) Exception to the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 265, 298 (1999) (arguing that American courts are increasingly
considering underlying custody issues when deciding Art. 13(b) defenses, and
that this trend undermines the objectives and intentions of the Hague
Convention).
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Objection Clause,66 is primarily concerned with advancing the child's
individual interests by preventing removal. 67 Therefore, the two clauses
are often interrelated, and respondents that raise a 13(b) defense often
bring a Child's Objection defense as well.68 In addition, as outlined
below, a child's objection is often considered within the rubric of 13(b)
as evidence of a "grave risk., 69  For this reason, much of the
interpretation and analysis given to the grave risk defense is also relevant
when considering Child's Objections.
Finally, the courts may decline to return a child if a sufficiently
mature child objects, and is of sufficient age and maturity to have that
objection considered by the courts.7° This provision, known as the
Child's Objection Clause, allows court to consider an abducted child's
views before returning that child to his or her country of habitual
residence.7' Unlike the Article 13(b) and Article 20 defenses, this
exception only requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.72
The Hague Convention does not define a threshold age at
which it is appropriate to consider a child's views, but instead
allows judges discretion to determine if a child is sufficiently
mature. 73  After a child makes an objection to return, the judge
66 To be discussed, infra.
67 Id.
68 See infra nn. 135-36.
69 See infra Part IV.
70 Hague Convention, supra note 33, art 13(b) at 101.
71 id.
72 See 42 U.S.C. §11603(e)(2)(B) (assigning "preponderance of evidence"
burden of proof for "children's objections" under Art. 13(b). The International
Child Remedies Act assigns burdens of proof for Hague defenses as follows: "In
the case of an action for the return of a child, a respondent who opposes the
return of the child has the burden of establishing - (A) by clear and convincing
evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in article 13b or 20 of the
Convention applies; and (B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any other
exception set forth in article 12 and 13 of the Convention applies." 42 U.S.C.
§1 1603(e)(2).
73 During the Conference Convention, all efforts at setting a minimum age for
considering the views of a child failed, and the drafters eventually compromised
by allowing judges to use their own discretion when deciding if the child's
views should be considered. See Nanos, supra note 2, at 444. See also Perez-
Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433, 30.
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determines if the objection is valid and if the child is sufficiently
mature to allow consideration of his or her views.74 Finally, if
these criteria are satisfied, the judge may allow the child's wishes
to be conclusive and refuse to return the child to his or her country
of habitual residence.75
II. The Child's Objection Clause of the Hague Convention on
International Abduction - International Creation and
American Interpretation
The Child's Objection Clause has come under heightened
scrutiny in recent years. 76 Advocates have called for both a widening and
a restriction on this Clause's use.77 Many have criticized the Clause for
not sufficiently considering children's wishes,78 while others have argued
that the Clause gives too much deference to the wishes of a child who
may be confused, immature, or influenced by the abducting parent.79
The conflicting issues surrounding this Clause can best be
illustrated by the story of two parents: an abductor, and one left behind.
Lady Catherine Meyer has struggled for more than seven years to regain
custody of her children after their abduction to Germany.8° In 1992, she
separated from her German husband and obtained custody of their two
children. 8' Two years later, she sent the children to Germany to spend
74 Id.
75 BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 178-79.
76 See Shirman, supra note 27 and note 28 for examples of scholarly criticism of
this clause.
77 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 201-02. See also Text and Legal Analysis,
supra note 57, at 10,510.78 See BEAUMONT, at 201-02.
79 See Jeanine Lewis, Comment: The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction.- When Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Impact the Goal of Comity, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW 391, 415 (2000) (listing
reasons cited by opponents of the "child's objection" exception for disallowing
such objections ).
80 See International Child Abduction: Implementation of the Hague Convention
on Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions: Hearing before the Comm.
on Int'l Relations, 106 th Congress, 33, (1999) (statement of Lady Catherine
Meyer, parent of an abducted child) [hereinafter Int'l Relations Hearing].
81 Id.
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the holidays with their father, and they never came back.82 Her husband
told her he would not return the two boys, and then disappeared with the
children.83 After Ms. Meyer filed suit in England under the Hague
Convention, the court ordered the children returned. 4
However, after asking the court for a half-hour to bring the
children to the building, Mr. Meyer again disappeared. s He later
appealed the court's Hague Convention ruling to a German court, citing
the Children's Objection to return under Article 13(2).86 The German
court upheld this defense, finding that a seven-year-old child was old
enough to decide because "a seven-year-old faced with the choice of
football or judo generally knows what to decide. 87 The court also stated
that returning the children would place them in an intolerable situation
because German was not spoken at home or at school, and the mother
held a job, and therefore had no time for the children.88
Since then, Meyer has made numerous applications to have the
children returned, but the German court rejected all of them. 89 Although
the court did grant her a short three-hour right of access to her children, 90
when she attempted to exercise these rights, the abductor refused to
allow the visit, stating that he feared a re-abduction and that the children
did not wish to see her. Because the courts do not enforce access rights,
no other remedy exists. Over the past six years, Ms. Meyer has seen her
children for less than six hours.9" She testified before Congress about the
effect the abduction has had: "There is hardly a day goes by when I don't
worry about my children; there is hardly a day goes by that I don't dream
about them. I, as a mother, can never rest in peace because I know that
the ultimate victims are the children. 92
82 Id. at 34
83 id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 id.
88 Int'l Relations Hearing, supra note 80, at 34.
89 id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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This case has been heavily criticized in international circles, and
in many ways represents the worst fears of those who argue against
broad interpretations of the Child's Objection Clause. Germany may
have the world's most liberal interpretation of the Child's Objection
Clause.93 The courts have refused return of an abducted child every
time a Child's Objection has been raised, even when the objecting child
was as young as four years old.94 The German use, and arguable abuse,
of the Child's Objection Clause has provoked the United States to pass
a resolution condemning Germany's actions, and urging the nation to
comply with the Hague Convention's requirements.95
At the opposite extreme, many courts refuse to hear any
children's objections. In the U.S., for example, children's objections
are routinely denied, to the point where many state that U.S. courts do
not recognize the Child's Objection Clause at all.96
Somewhere between these two extremes lies justice. Judges are
asked to navigate a winding, thick forest of legal, emotional,
psychological, and sociological issues, without much guidance, and
with much at stake. How much weight should judges give children's
objections? Given the strong conflicting interests, and the strong
potential for abuse of the Clause, how should courts weigh children's
objections? Have American courts' interpretations fulfilled the
expectations and objectives of the Hague Convention, and the interests
of abducted children?
93 See Nigel Lowe, INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION:
HAGUE CONVENTION ACTION AGENDA 12 [Hereinafter Lowe Report] (finding
that in Germany, between 1990 and 1996, in every case in which a child's
objection was raised, a return was refused). See generally Karin Wolfe, Note: A
Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures of the 1980 Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in the United States and
Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Pol. 285, 324 (Fall 2002), for an overview of
German case law interpreting children's objections in Hague Convention cases.
94 See Lowe Report, supra note 93, at 12.
95 See H. Con. Res. 293, 106 h Cong. (2000) (enacted) Urging Compliance with
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
96 See Nanos, supra note 2, at 448-50 (stating that the U.S. courts do not
specifically interpret the Child's Objection Clause, instead addressing children's
views within the framework of the "grave risk of harm exception").
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A. Legislative history
The Child's Objection Clause was passed after much debate
among Conference participants and represents a compromise between
many conflicting interests.97 Many felt that a clause allowing children to
decide their place of residence simply needed to be included. 98 First,
many assumed that such a clause was necessary given the 16-year age
limit on the treaty's applicability.99 The Hague Convention only applies
to children under 16 because the drafters assumed that older adolescents
would already have a more independent existence and a mind of their
own, making it difficult to return an objecting teenager against his
will.'00 The same situation, however, often exists when adolescents are
younger than 16.101 Therefore, the drafters wanted some judicial
discretion to refuse return, and avoid the specter of forcible repatriations,
which could harm public perception of the treaty.1"2
Second, many countries allow children under sixteen to choose
their own place of residence in custody proceedings. 10 3 While some
conference members initially proposed that the Convention should not
apply at all in such cases, the drafters eventually rejected this proposal.'0 4
The Child's Objection Clause allows judges the discretion to refuse
returns when the child is legally entitled to choose his residence, without
excluding such cases from the Hague Convention completely. 0 5
9
' Id. at 443
98 Id. at 444 ("drafters concluded.., that a reservation enabling courts to consider
the views of a child was 'absolutely necessary' ").
99 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 178-179
100 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, 77. (stating that the Convention
included the 16-year age limit because a person over sixteen "generally has a
mind of his own which cannot be easily ignored by either ... his parents ... or
by a judicial or administrative authority"). See also BEAUMONT, supra note 4, at
178 n.6. (This clause also offset the concerns of a small minority of drafters who
favored lowering the age limit.)
1o' See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433 30. The Explanatory Report
gives the example of a fifteen-year-old who objects to return, and states that it is
difficult to accept that a child of that age should be returned against their will.
Id.
102 BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 178.
103 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 450, 78.
104 Id.
1o5 Id.
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Finally, the Clause allows consideration of the child's best interests and
allows children a voice in the Hague proceedings regarding where they
should live.
10 6
While drafters conceded that it was necessary to have some
terms for considering a child's views, many remained concerned about
the possible ramifications of such a clause. 0 7 These critics argued that
such an article would open the door to abuse, both by judicial authorities
and abducting parents. 10 8 For example, many argued an abducting parent
could unduly influence a child's views. This parent could retain the
child by manipulating the child into stating that she did not wish to be
returned to her home country. 10 9  In addition, a child may suffer
psychological harm if she feels that she is being forced to choose
between the two parents."0 Some also argued the Clause could be used
by judicial authorities to examine the merits of the underlying custody
dispute, in violation of the objectives of the Hague Convention.I'"
Finally, numerous countries remained uncomfortable with the
very notion of allowing children's wishes to be considered in private law
cases. 112 In many countries, including the U.S., courts were under no
statutory duty to consider the wishes of younger children in custody
hearings. 113 At the time the treaty was formed (1980), the concept of
"children's rights" was in its inception, and many were apprehensive
106 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 178.
107 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 179 - 80 (examining why the "child's
objection" provision proved so contentious when introduced during Convention
drafting).
108 id.
109 Id. at 180. These concerns were cited by both the West German and U.S.
responses. Id. at n. 18.
"0 Id. at 179-80. This concern is echoed in the Explanatory Report, which states
that the "child's objection" provision could prove dangerous if children are
directly questioned in such a way that they feel they must choose between two
parents. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433, para. 30.
111 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 180.
112 See Id. at 179 (stating that the intense opposition to this clause may be
explained by the relative novelty of considering children's wishes during that
time).
113 Id. In the U.S., the common-law rule was that children under fourteen were
not to be consulted, although some case law suggests judges did in fact consult
children in some cases.
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about a provision that they believed allowed a child to interpret his own
best interests.' 14
The draft of Article 13 reflected many of these concerns while
still attempting to preserve the main objectives of the Clause. At first,
drafters attempted to set a minimum age at which a child's views could
be considered by the courts.' 15 Ultimately, however, the drafters could
not agree on a minimum age because all ages suggested seemed arbitrary
and artificial." 6  Eventually, the Convention's framers unanimously
agreed to leave to the judicial authorities the discretion to decide when a
child is of sufficient age and maturity to allow consideration of their
views.' 
1 7
As with the other Article 13 defenses, judges are not required to
give effect to this Clause. 18 Instead, the drafters allowed judges ultimate
discretion to decide whether a return should be ordered." 19 A judge may
still order a child returned, for example, even if an abducting parent
establishes one of the Article 13 defenses. 20 Therefore, even if a judge
finds that the child is sufficiently mature and has in fact objected, the
judge may still order the child to be returned in spite of those
114 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433. See Nanos, supra note 2, at 444
(stating that the drafters were "apprehensive" about the provision, but concluded
a reservation enabling courts to consider the views of a child was "absolutely
necessary").
"s The Special Commission originally passed a motion in 1979 declaring that
twelve should be the minimum age for consideration of a child's views.
However, this proposal was later abandoned by the Drafting Committee.
BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 179.
116 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433, 30.
17id.
118 See Text and Legal Analysis, supra note 57, at 10,510 (stating that
application of the Article 13 "child's preference" exception to the return
obligation is not mandatory).
119 Id. The Hague Convention grants judges a great deal of discretion to order a
child's return. Under Article 18, none of the Convention provisions limit the
judicial authority's power to order the return of the child at any time. See Perez-
Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433 112
120 See Nanos, supra note 2, at 445 (stating that the court may still order the
child's return, even if the abducting parent establishes one or more affirmative
defenses).
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objections. 121 This provision addresses to some extent the concerns of
those who feared the effects of "undue" parental influence on a child's
views. If a judge feels that the child's objection is a result of
"brainwashing" by the abducting parent, he may decide to attach little
weight to those objections, in spite of the child's maturity. 122
Judges have a great deal of discretionary power when
considering an Article 13(2) defense. First, the judge has discretion to
decide when a child is of sufficient age and maturity to have their views
considered by the courts. 123 Second, the judge has discretion to order the
child returned, even if a valid Child's Objection is raised. 124 The lack of
objective criteria in the Convention itself for deciding these issues has
left the door open for potentially arbitrary decision-making by judges. 125
In addition, judges in the abducted-to nation may favor the abducting
parent, who is often a citizen of that country. 126 Given the nebulous
criteria, the process is somewhat open to judicial abuse.
The final draft of the Child's Objection Clause represented a
compromise between participants who wanted consideration of
children's wishes, and those who were apprehensive about the potential
misuse of such a clause. 27 To a certain extent, the arguments initiated
during the Hague Conference continue on to this day. Family law
practitioners and scholars continue to debate how courts should weigh
children's objections. 128
121 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 179. The Hague convention grants judges a
great deal of discretion to order a child's return. Under Article 18, none of the
Convention provisions limit the judicial authority's power to order the return of
the child at any time. Once an affirmative defense is established, return is no
longer mandatory; however, the judge retains discretion to order return at any
time.
122 See Text and Legal Analysis, supra note 57, at 10,510.
123 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 99, at 450 78.
124 id.
125 See Nanos, supra note 2, at 445 (citing legitimate concerns that the lack of a
minimum age for considering a child's view could lead to "subjective and
arbitrary decisions").
121 Id. at 447.
121 Id. at 443.
128 Id. at 446-448.
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The Hague Convention emphasizes immediate return in order to
discourage future abductions and help the child return to her home
environment. 29  However, protecting this interest requires courts to
avoid considering the child's best interests in most cases, as they would
in a traditional custody proceeding. 130  The affirmative defenses
contained in Article 13 and Article 20 are the only exceptions allowing
courts to consider the child's individual interests in a Hague
proceeding.131 For this reason, these defenses have become the center of
debate. Some argue that these defenses should be given a very liberal
interpretation because they represent the only way of considering a
child's individual interests. However, others argue that these defenses
should be interpreted very narrowly, so as not to impede the main
objective of the treaty: the prompt return of abducted children. It is
argued that by allowing too many defenses, judges will "drive a horse
and chariot" through the treaty, allowing abductors to profit from the
abduction, impeding the speedy return of children, and opening the door
to potential judicial bias. 132
This central tension is present as well in the Child's Objection
Clause. With the treaty's emphasis on broad judicial discretion, judges
ultimately have the power to interpret the Child's Objection Clause.
Given this discretion, how have American judges interpreted this clause?
How have American judges resolved this inherent tension?
B. U.S. Interpretation of the Child's Objection Clause of
the Hague Convention on International Abduction
U.S. courts have tended to adhere to a very strict interpretation
of the Child's Objection Clause, and judges are very hesitant to prevent
129 Id. at 438
130 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 432, . 23. The Explanatory Report
emphasizes that "the dispositive part of the Convention contains no explicit
reference to the interests of the child" to the extent that recognizing such
interests would impede the Convention's stated object. Id. However, the
preamble of the Convention states that the states declare themselves "firmly
convinced that the interests of children are of paramount concern in matters
relating to their custody." Id.
131 Id.
132 BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 179.
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return based on this clause.133 Evidence shows that U.S. courts have a
"definite disinclination ... to defer to a child's objection. 134 In almost
every case in which a child's objection was raised, American courts
refused to allow return based on that objection. 35 Indeed, it is difficult
to find any cases in which a child's objection, standing alone, prevented
that child's return. 36 As one commentator stated: "In the U.S., analysis
under the child's objection exception is fairly straightforward - for the
most part, it does not exist."'137 In general, the U.S position favors a
"return at all costs," and is therefore reluctant to entertain any defenses
that would prevent immediate return of the abducted child.1
38
This position is reflected in most U.S. cases that have considered
Child's Objections in Hague Convention proceedings. Traditionally,
U.S. judges gave little or no weight to children's views in Hague
cases.139 U.S. courts will rarely allow a child's objection, standing alone,
to prevent return. 40 In fact, for many years, the U.S. was considered to
not allow "children's objections" except as one factor in a "grave risk of
harm" defense.'14  Parties have in fact raised independent "children's
objections" under Article 13(2), but such defenses have rarely been
successful. 42  Evidence exists, that this trend may be changing;
143
133 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351 (stating that U.S. courts are unlikely to
defer to child's objection as a reason for denying a return request).
134 Nanos, supra note 2, at 448.
135 See generally Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction: A Brief Overview and Case Law Analysis, 28 Fam. L. Q. 9 (1994)
(finding that cases reflect that this defense is seldom used to avoid return);
BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 184 n.60 (noting that the authors had only found
one unpublished case in which U.S. courts denied a child's return based on Art.
13(2)).
136 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351.
137 Id.
131 Id. at 347
139 Id. at 351.
140 Id.
14 See Nanos, supra note 2, at 448-49 (stating that U.S. courts, while not
specifically interpreting the "child's objection clause," address issues
concerning children's views within the "grave risk of harm" exception).
142 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351-55 for discussion of U.S. case law and
trends.
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however, the varying and inconsistent interpretations offered by U.S.
courts make it difficult to establish a coherent pattern.144 This section
will outline how U.S. courts have treated Child's Objections that are
raised as an independent defense to return. First, this section will look at
how courts determine if a child is of sufficient "age and maturity" to
allow consideration of their views, and what is required for a valid
objection. Second, this section will examine how children's objections
have been tied into and interrelated with other defenses, with the courts
seemingly adopting more liberal interpretations in such cases.
1. Traditional Analysis of the Child's Objection
as an Independent Defense and What
Constitutes Sufficient Age and Maturity
When a judge hears a child's objection under Article 13(2), he
must decide if the child actually objects to return, 145 and if the child is of
a sufficient age and maturity to allow that child's objection to be
considered. 146 If the judge does decide that the child is of sufficient age
and maturity, the court will then consider the child's objection, allowing
the objection to prevent return in some cases. 147 However, even if a valid
objection is raised by a sufficiently mature child, the court retains
discretion to return the child in spite of that objection.148 Typically,
courts narrowly construe the Child's Objection exception, as they do with
other Hague defenses.
49
In order to determine what the child's objection is, the judge may
first have the child interviewed; in court, 5 ° in-camera,15' or by a child
143 See, e.g. infra Part III(B)(2) for discussion of possible liberalization of
requirements for child's objections in cases involving domestic violence.
144Id.
145 Id. at 340.
146 Id.
147 BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 179.
148 Id.
149 id.
150 See HON. JAMES D. GARBOL1NO, INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY CASES:
HANDLING HAGUE CONVENTION CASES IN U.S. COURTS 200 (3rd ed. 2000)
(stating that courts may ascertain a child's wishes by allowing the child to testify
in court). However, most judges disfavor this method because it could be an
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welfare officer or psychological professional. 152 Once the child's views
have been determined, the court must then decide if the child is old
enough and mature enough to allow consideration of that child's
objection. '53 Often, the court will ask a psychologist or professional for
an opinion as to that child's age and maturity.' 54
Although the Hague Convention does lay out the procedural
framework, it does little to establish when these criteria are met. The
treaty itself offers little guidance as to what constitutes sufficient "age
and maturity" to make a Child's Objection: it does not define a threshold
age or objective criteria for assessing maturity.' 5  This lack of objective
criteria may help explain the varying rulings on Hague Child's Objection
Clause cases in U.S. courts. Courts have issued widely varying, and
often conflicting, rulings as to when a child is of sufficient age and
maturity to allow consideration of her views.
While the treaty itself contains no "threshold age" for hearing
children's objections, some U.S. courts have issued rulings stating that
children below a certain age may not be consulted. In the case of Tahan
v. Duquette,156 the court held that the Children's Objection Clause
"simply does not apply to a nine-year old."' 5 7 In that case, the appeals
intimidating experience for the child, and could force them into a potential lose-
lose situation of choosing publicly between two parents. Id.
151 In this method, the judge interviews the child in chambers, outside the
presence of counsel and family. Id. This method is often used in U.S. courts, and
was utilized in many of the Hague cases involving a child's preference.
152 In this method, the psychologist examines the child and reports her findings
to the court. This method allows children to voice an objection without the
possible pressures of a court setting, and allows a real examination by an expert
who can ascertain if the child has a true, independent objection to return. Id.
Courts may also appoint independent counsel for the child in lieu of an
interview, however, this method has only once been used in U.S. courts. Id.
153 Herring, supra note 13, at 164.
154 id.
155 See Part II(A), supra (citing the large role for judicial discretion in 13(2)
exceptions, and noting that drafters intentionally did not include a threshold age
or specific criteria for determining "age and maturity" for purposes of
determining child's preferences).
156 613 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992).
157 Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992). In Tahan, the
child's father retained the boy in the U.S following a summer visit. The child's
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court found that the trial judge had not erred by failing to interview the
child to determine if his objection to return should be considered.158 In
fact, the appeals court stated that interviewing the child would have
served no purpose.15 9 The court stated that the Child's Objection Clause
only applies if a child is of sufficient age and maturity, and therefore
clearly did not apply to a nine-year-old child. 160 However, Tahan did not
contain analysis of why a nine-year old is inherently of insufficient age
of maturity, a contention that seems at odds with the drafter's decision
not to create a minimum threshold age. 161 The drafters decided not to
create a minimum age because any age seemed arbitrary and artificial;
instead, they allowed courts to make an individualized determination if a
particular child had sufficient age and maturity to invoke the clause.
62
In seeming to set a blanket minimum age, the court may no longer make
a determination based on a particular child's maturity and experiences;
instead, courts may dismiss a case without even hearing that child's
objection.
Other cases have followed suit in denying the objections of
younger children. For example, in the case of Sheikh v. Cahill,163 the
court interviewed the child, and found that although the child did object
mother filed a petition under the Hague Convention, and the court ordered the
child's return. Id. at 486. The child's father appealed, stating that the trial court
had erred in refusing to consider defenses raised under Art. 13(b) and Article
13(2). Id. The appeals court affirmed the trial court, holding that 1.) the
petitioner had not proved a "grave risk of harm" under 13(b) because no
evidence proffered related not to the child's surroundings, but instead to matters
more suited to a custody hearing in Quebec, Id. at 489, and 2.) that failure to
interview the child was not plain error, because the child's objection clause does
not apply to a nine-year-old. Id. at 490.
58 Id. at 490
159 Id.
160 id.
161 In fact, a court-appointed psychologist did examine the child in question, and
the court included a certification from that psychologist which endeavored to
establish that the child possessed the requisite age and maturity to lodge an
effective objection. Id. at 490 n. 1. However, the court stated that the material
actually did not establish this proposition, and ruled that the child was not of
requisite age and maturity. Id.
162 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 433, 30.
163 Sheikh v. Cahill, 145 Misc.2d 171, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
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to returning to his country of habitual residence, the child was not of
sufficient age and maturity to allow consideration of his views, stating
flatly that "he is only nine years old.' 64
Although Tahan seemed to establish as a matter of law that a
nine-year-old may not raise an objection under Article 13(2), other courts
have stated that the views of children as young as seven may be heard. 165
In the case of Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro,166 the respondent raised an
objection under Article 13(2), contending that the eight-year-old child
objected to return.16 However, the petitioning parent filed for summary
judgment, claiming that the courts were precluded by law from taking
into account the views of an eight-year-old. 168 That court denied the
motion, holding that because the Hague treaty does not contain a
minimum threshold age, the court should be allowed to interview a child
of eight, who may be of sufficient age and maturity to allow
164 Id. (holding that the child was wrongfully removed to the U.S. from his
country of habitual residence, and ordering the child's return, because 1) The
Hague Convention did apply in this case and 2) abducting parent had not met
burden of proof to show defenses under 13(b) or 13(2)). In Sheikh, the court
considered whether a child was wrongfully removed by his father to the U.S.
from the U.K. Id. at 172. In this case, the two parents became estranged, and the
mother was eventually awarded custody, with the father having visitation. Id. at
173. Later, the mother removed the child without the father's knowledge to
England. Id. After the child had a visit with his father in New York, the father
refused to return the child and filed for custody. Id. The mother filed a wrongful
removal charge under the Hague Convention Id. at 174. The court found that the
child was wrongfully removed to the U.S. and ordered his return. Id. The court
rejected the father's defenses; finding that he had presented no evidence that the
child faced a grave risk of harm in the U.K., and that the child was not of
sufficient age and maturity to allow the court to take account of his views. Id. at
177. The court stated that the child's objection was most likely a result of being
wooed by his father during the summer vacation. Id.
165 See Blondin, infra note 217.
166 131 F.Supp. 2d 953.
167 See Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(holding that court was not precluded as a matter of law from considering views
of eight-year-old under Art. 13(2), but denying "grave risk of harm" defense,
citing lack of evidence).
168 Id. at 957.
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consideration of his views. 169 However, the court still used its discretion
to order that the child be returned to his home country.
170
These cases establish very different interpretations of whether a
young child should even be interviewed at all to consider their age and
maturity, with Tahan stating flatly the exception could not apply to such
a young child, and Raijmaker leaving a more open approach allowing the
possibility that an eight-year-old may in fact be of "sufficient age and
maturity" to allow consideration of his objection. The Raijmaker court
also reinforced the principle that judges have discretion, but that they
must at least have some discovery regarding the child's maturity before
dismissing the case.
171
The conflict regarding the applicability of the Child's Objection
Clause based on age is redoubled when the courts must determine if an
individual child is also mature enough to allow him to raise a Child's
Objection. While some decisions have established a lower age limit that
precludes objections, there is no higher limit age at which objections
must be considered. Courts have decided that age alone is not enough to
activate this clause; instead, the child must also show a "degree of
maturity."'' 72 Given the lack of set criteria for determining "maturity,"
courts have used different methods. Some judges focus on the child's
level of understanding; as when one judge rejected an eight-year old's
objection because, during an interview, she could not name her year of
birth or school classes, did not understand the nature of the hearing, and
referred to both the petitioning natural father and her stepfather as her
father. 173 Other courts have allowed psychologists or counselors to
169 id.
170 id.
171 Id.
172 See Bickerton v. Bickerton, No. 91-06694 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991)
(unpublished opinion) (rejecting 12-year-old child's objection to return, and
stating that "[a]ge alone is not a sufficient means for making this determination;
if it were, the drafters of the language in Article 13 would not have added the
conjunctive requirement of 'degree of maturity.' At some age level, the court
could possibly make such a determination, based solely upon age (i.e., if the
child were 15 and a half years old). However, even those circumstances,
evidence of lack of ordinary maturity could negate such a finding)".
171 See In re Interest of Zarate, 1996 WL 734613 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that
the petitioner had shown his child was "wrongfully removed" to the U.S. from
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testify about whether a child has the age and maturity at which his views
should be considered. 7 4  However, psychological testimony is not
dispositive, and the courts have on occasion found children were not
sufficiently mature in spite of expert psychological testimony to the
contrary. 75 Because this is essentially a fact-based determination, judges
may often simply base the decision on their own examination and
observations of the child.'76
However, in the case of England v. England,'77 the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed a very strict interpretation regarding when a child will be of
sufficient age and maturity to raise an objection. 17  This case involved a
"wrongful removal" by the children's mother after she refused to send
the children back to Australia after an extended visit in the U.S.' 79 The
children's father then filed suit for the children's return under the Hague
Convention.'"0 The district court ruled that the children had been
wrongfully retained in the U.S.,"' but then considered defenses the
Mexico, and finding that respondent had failed to prove defenses raised under
Art. 13 of the Convention).
174 See, e.g. Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, 2000 WL 1611123, p. 17, (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(stating that both psychological experts agree that the eldest children have
appropriate age and maturity at which their views should be considered, and
finding that the children's objection may therefore prevent return).
175 See, e.g., supra note 161 (court finds child does not have requisite "age and
maturity" in spite of psychological certification); and Navarro v. Bullock, No.
86481 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1989). In the latter case, the court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the children, age 12 and 10, lacked the
requisite age and maturity, stating this was evident from the psychologist's
testimony. Id. However, the psychologist in that case had actually
recommended that the children be allowed to remain in the United States. Id.
176 See e.g. England v. England, 234 F. 3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that the
trial judge could accurately determine child's age and maturity because he had
the benefit of hearing the child's testimony and conducting a one-on-one
interview).
177 id.
178 Id. at 272 (holding that 13-year-old child was not mature enough to allow
consideration of her objection under Art. 13(2) of the Hague Convention).
"
79 Id. at 269.
180 id.
181 Id.
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respondent raised under Article 13(b) (grave risk of harm) and Article
13(2) (Child's Objection Clause). 182
The court concluded that the children would face grave risk of
psychological harm if returned.'83 The judge also found that Karina, the
13-year-old eldest child, was mature enough to allow the court to
consider her objections to return under Article 13(2), and held that that
her objection would prevent her return to Australia. 84 However, on
appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the appeals court reversed the district court's
ruling, and held that the child was not sufficiently mature to allow
consideration of her objection. 185 The court found that the trial court did
not cite enough specific evidence to prove the child's maturity. 86 The
appeals court also decided that she lacked sufficient maturity based on
the fact that the child had Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), took
Ritalin, and was "scared and confused" by the proceedings.' 87 Based on
this evidence, and the "narrow construction" of the Child's Objection
Clause, the appeals court held that the exception could not be invoked in
this case.1
88
In a strong dissent, Judge DeMoss argued that the court should
have upheld the trial court's finding that the child possessed sufficient
maturity.1 89  DeMoss argued that the appeals court should show
deference to the trial court's finding, as that judge had the opportunity to
listen to and speak with the child.' 90 In addition, he argued that the
record actually supported that the child was mature - she had maintained
her grades, and participated in school sports. He was also troubled by
the court's determination that ADD correlates with immaturity, arguing
that the court is ill-qualified to make such psychological diagnosis
182 id.
183 Id. at 270.
184 Id. at 272. (The trial court found that "K has clearly objected ... to being
returned to Australia and she is old enough and mature enough for the Court to
take account of her views)."185 id.
186 id.
187 Id. at 273
188 Id.
189 Id at 275. See also Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 354-55 for an interpretation
of the judge's dissent in this case.
'90 Id. at 274.
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without expert testimony. 9' Finally, DeMoss argued that the court's
narrow construction seemed to disregard the objections of this child, and
the fact that "if the 'age and maturity' exception ... is to have any force
at all, it must be available for a child who is less than 16 years old."' 92
The England case exemplifies the "narrow construction"
approach generally favored by U.S courts, and their general reluctance to
consider a child's views. Although thirteen approaches the Hague
Convention's sixteen year-old cut-off age, the appellate court still
determined that the child lacked maturity. 193 By requiring specific proof
of the child's maturity, the court sets a fairly rigorous standard for
establishing maturity, a standard that may be very difficult for parties to
meet. In addition, without seeing or interviewing the child, the appellate
court overturned the decision of a judge who had. In a certain sense, this
case seems to lend credence to the critics who claim that the U.S.'s
policy amounts to a blanket denial of Child Objections. At any rate, the
England case, one of the few to reach the appellate level, reinforces the
courts' trend favoring very strict application of the clause.
2. What Constitutes a "Valid Objection" in
U.S. Courts?
i. Nature of the Objection
For an objection to be considered, the child must be "sufficiently
mature" and also register a valid objection. 9 4 But what is a "valid
objection"? Judges have inherent discretion in this matter' 95 and may use
their best judgment, previous cases, and the child's own testimony to
decide.' 96 For example, if the judge believes that the child's objection is
the result of undue influence from an abducting parent, the judge may
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13(b).
195 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 101, at 113. ("The very nature of these
exceptions gives judges a discretion - and does not impose upon them a duty - to
refuse to return a child in certain circumstances.")
196 Id.
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give little weight to that objection.' 97  In U.S. courts, children's
objections are typically narrowly construed, 198 and therefore, judges may
decide that the child's views do not in fact constitute a valid objection. 199
Judges must also confront the question of what a valid objection
must address: should the child object to the country or must she only
object to the petitioning parent? Judges also have to decide whether the
child's preference is a "mere wish" (i.e. that the parents will reunite) or a
real objection to return. Finally, the judge has to determine if the child is
voicing his own wishes, or merely parroting the views of the abducting
parent. Courts show conflicting views in this area, where some consider
objections to being returned to the petitioning parent, while others only
consider an objection to being returned to the petitioner's country.2 °°
Similarly, some courts have weighed the strength of the objection,
requiring a strong objection to return,0 1 while other courts seem to
accept less forceful objections.0 2
As a general rule, courts require the child's objection to be
stronger than a mere preference to remain with one parent.20 3 For
example, in the case of Norden-Powers v. Beveridge,2 °4 the court refused
to consider the children's views, stating that their preferences did not rise
to the level of an objection to return. 20 5 All three children stated in an
19' Text and Legal Analysis, supra note 57, at 10,510. The Legal Analysis
emphasizes that the discretionary nature of the defense is especially important
given the potential for brainwashing by the abducting parent. Id.
198 See Text and Legal Analysis, supra note 57.
199 Id.
200 See discussion infra Part II(B)(2)(1).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351. See also BEAUMONT, supra note 4, at 189
(stating that preferences based on a desire to remain with the abductor are
accorded little credence in England, France, Australia and the U.S.); and
Herring, supra note 13, at 164 (stating that courts generally require evidence
more than a preference to remain with the abducting parent).
204 125 F.Supp. 2d 634.
205 Norden-Powers v. Beveridge, 125 F. Supp. 2d. 634, 641 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) [In
Norden, the court ordered three children returned to Australia following their
wrongful removal by their mother to the U.S. Id. The court found that the
petitioning father had established a prima facie case of wrongful removal, and
rejected the mother's defenses that 1.) father was not exercising custody rights
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interview with the judge that they wished to stay together, and that they
wished to remain with their mother, the abducting parent.20 6 While the
court stated it was "sympathetic to the concerns of each child, ' '2 7 it
nevertheless found that their voiced preferences did not rise to an
objection to return under Article 13(2).208 Although the judge found that
the children's expressed wishes do not qualify as an objection, the
opinion did not outline what does qualify as an objection, or what was
lacking in this case.
Courts may also weigh the strength of an objection. In one case,
the court rejected a 13-year-old's objection because the child had not
201lodged a "strong objection" to returning to the petitioning country.
The child did not fear for his personal safety and had no objection to
seeing his mother in the future, but only wished to stay in the United
States for the time being. Therefore, the court reasoned that his wishes
did not rise to a true objection to return, but instead reflected wishes
more suited to an ultimate custody determination.
210
After hearing a child's views, courts have also decided that the
child did not actually make an objection. For example, a child who
wishes that the parents would reunite, or that she could see missed pets in
the abducted-to country, will probably not have a valid objection to
return. 21 In In re Nicholson,212 the court found that the 10-year-old
21
child actually had no substantial objection to return. 13 Instead, the child
simply "finds herself wishing the family could remain intact," and would
miss either parent, or either home, if forced to live elsewhere.21 4 Citing
under 13(a), and 2.) the children objected to return under 13(2). Id. at 635 The
court found that the father did in fact have custody at the time, and that the
children's stated preference to remain with their mother did not rise to an
objection to return. Id at 641.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 id.
211 See, e.g. In re Nicholson, infra note 213.
212 1997 WL 446432.
213 In re Nicholson, 1997 WL 446432, 446435 (1997) (finding that the child
expressed wish parents would reunite, and would miss pets, but did not express
strong objection to return).
214 id.
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the "narrow construction" required of Article 13(2) objections, the court
found such wishes do not rise to a real objection to being returned.2t5
In short, the narrow construction of the Child's Objection Clause
in the U.S. has allowed judges to reject children's objections that are not
of the required nature. However, one problem is determining what is the
required nature for a child's objection. While some cases emphasize that
216the child must object to the country, others seem to allow objections
based mainly upon a wish not to be returned to the petitioning parent.2
17
218In addition, while at least one case required a "forceful" objection,
most cases had little or no examination of the strength of the child's
objection.219
While a high threshold certainly exists, the lack of any definition
or guidance as to what form an objection should take has led to some
conflicting interpretations in U.S. courts. Indeed, in some cases the
holdings seem mutually contradictory, as when Norden-Powers denies an
objection because the children objected only to the petitioning parent,
and Case Y rejects an objection because the children had no objection to
the petitioning parent. The common problem with all these decisions is a
lack of analysis. In Nicholson, the court simply stated that the child's
wishes did not rise to an objection but did not explain why the views
would not qualify. Similarly, in Escaf and Rodriguez, the cases
contained conclusory, short statements that the objections were not valid
but did not cite to specific precedent or contain analysis as to why the
objections did not qualify.22° In all these cases, the child's objection was
disposed of in one paragraph.
215 Id.
216 See Norden-Powers v. Beveridge, 125 F. Supp. 2d. 634, 641 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(stating that child's objection based on desire to remain with abducting parent
does not amount to an "objection to return" to resident country under Art.
13(2)).
217 See, e.g. Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240 (2 nd Cir. 1999). For discussion of
this case, see infra Part III(B)(1).
218 Id.
219 id.
220 See, e.g. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 33 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Md. 1999)
(denying a child's objection, though child was of sufficient age and maturity,
because return would further the aims of the Hague Convention). See also Escaf
v. Rodriguez, 52 Fed.Appx. 207 (4th Cir. 2002).
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ii. Role of Discretional Denials
Even if the criteria for a valid child's objection are met, judges
retain discretion to order a return in spite of the objection.2 2' In a sense,
a valid objection under Article 13(2) merely "opens the door" and allows
courts to consider the child's objection. The judge may still decide how
much weight she wishes to give that objection and whether she will
allow that objection to prevent return. For example, a court may decide
to give little weight if it believes the child's objection is the result of
undue parental influence.222
In the U.S., judges will often use discretion to issue return orders
despite a child's valid objection. 3 In many of these cases, the objection
is denied based on evidence of undue parental influence. 4 However, in
other cases the child is returned in spite of the valid objection, because
return would "further the aims of the Hague Convention. 225 Discretion
has been routinely invoked in U.S. cases to return children under the
Hague Convention and reflects the primary interest that U.S. courts place
on the immediate return of abducted children. In a sense, the U.S. courts
seem to be saying that allowing a child's objection to prevent return is
always against the aims and objectives of the Hague Convention.
However, the question remains as to whether such a position has
merit. The drafters intended that children's objections should have some
consideration in court proceedings, which is why the Clause was
included. The U.S. approach of consistently denying valid "children's
objections" of sufficiently mature children actually seems to contradict
the aims of the Hague Convention by essentially overlooking one of its
key provisions.
221 The Hague Convention states that the court may refuse to order the return of
the child if a valid objection is made; it does not require the courts to do so. See
Hague Convention, supra note 22, at Art. 13(2). See also Nanos, supra note 2, at
445 (stating that even when one or more defense are established, the court may
still order the child's immediate return, although the Convention does not
mandate return.)
222 See Text and Analysis, supra note 32, at 10,510.
223 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 363 ( stating that the US court tend to favor
a policy of "return at all costs" in Hague proceedings).
224 See Robinson v. Robinson, infra note 235 at 1344.
225 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, supra note 220, at 462.
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IM. Policy Objectives Favoring Liberal and Strict
Construction of the Child's Objection Clause
Courts, scholars, and countries remain divided regarding how
much weight courts should give children's objections under the Hague
Convention. While some courts, such as those in the United States,
typically give extremely strict interpretation to this Clause, courts in
other countries have applied this Clause more liberally.22 6 While some
commentators have applauded the American approach to Hague
defenses, stating that the strict approach preserves the objectives of the
227 ~ hvtreaty, others have criticized the American approach as one of "return
at all costs, 228 which does little to protect children's interests or rights.
229
So, given all the countervailing policy interests, is the U.S. approach
valid, or does it fail to consider important interests? Part One of this
section will examine the reasons favoring the traditional strict
interpretation, while Part Two will examine policy reasons for adopting a
more liberal interpretation.
A. Policy Arguments for Strict Construction
In determining how judges should view Hague Convention
defenses, many argue that judges should always strictly interpret such
defenses. In fact, many argue that children's objections should not have
any role in Hague Convention cases.230 Critics argue that the Child's
Objection Clause should be strictly constructed for many policy reasons:
226 See Lowe, supra note 93, at 12.
227 See, e.g. Nanos, supra note 2, at 462 (arguing that courts should limit
invocation of the provision to extraordinary circumstances and should adhere to
a strict interpretation of the clause).
228 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 363 (criticizing the U.S. for being
unwilling to allow more consideration of children's views, instead adopting a
"return at all costs" position).
229 Id.
230 See Brenda J. Shirman, Note, International Treatment of Child Abduction
and the 1980 Hague Convention, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 188, 219 (1991)
(arguing that the exception allowing deference to the child's wishes should be
removed to eliminate the possibility of undue influence by the abducting parent).
See generally Gary Zalkin, The Increasing Incidence of American Courts
Allowing Abducting Parents to Use the Article 13(b) Exception to the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 23 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 265 (Winter 1999).
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to protect the overarching goals of the Convention, to protect children
from having to choose between parents, and to prevent against possible
manipulation by the abducting parent. 31' For these and other reasons,
many judges and commentators believe that judges should exercise their
discretion to narrowly construe children's objections, and that these
objections should rarely, if ever, prevent the child from being returned to
his custodial parent. 232
The Hague Convention itself, as well as the U.S. State
Department commentary, emphasizes the discretionary nature of the
Clause - a discretion many believed was necessary because of the
possibility that the abducting parent could brainwash the child. 33 Many
judges also cite similar concerns that the child's wishes may be
manipulated or shaped by the abducting parent. 234 For example, in the
case of Robinson v. Robinson,235 the judge decided not to rely on a 10-
year old child's objection to return because the judge believed that the
child had been "unduly influenced. 236 The judge concluded that it was
inescapable that a caring parent would try to influence the child to stay
231 See, e.g. Weiner, supra note 14, at 289 (arguing that "a uniform interpretation
of the treaty is particularly important given its subject matter... Absent a
uniform interpretation, potential abductors may be encouraged to abduct,
believing they can exploit divergent legal interpretations and thereby avoid the
Convention's application and sanction.")
232 See Nanos, supra note 2, at 459-60.
233 See, e.g. Public Notice 957, Hague International Child Abduction
Convention; Text and Legal Analysis by the Dept. of State, 51 Fed. Reg. 10493,
10510 (1986) (stating that clause is discretionary "because of the potential for
brainwashing of the child by the alleged abductor. A child's objection to return
may be accorded little if any weight if the court believes that the child's
preference is the product of the abducting parent's undue influence over the
child").
234 See generally Barbara L. House, Considering the Child's Preference in
Determining Custody: Is It Really in the Child's Best Interest? 19 J.JUV.L. 176
(1998) (offering guidance to judges in distinguishing children's valid wishes
from possible parental influence/alienation).
235 Robinson v. Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Colo. 1997)
236 Id. at 1344. (The court held that the child must be returned, in spite of
objections raised by the child, because of the presence of "undue influence" by
the abducting parent, and the court's belief that forcing the child to choose
between his parents was too much of a burden for the child to make).
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with him, and that the fact the child used legal terms such as "settled"
showed some parental influence.237
Commentators also argue that the Clause should be narrowly
construed because children are not always capable of understanding, or
making an informed decision about their welfare. On a related note,
many judges and commentators point out that forcing a child to choose
between their parents can impose an undue burden on the child's well-
being or cause additional psychological harm.238 In times of instability,
these commentators argue that children need to be immediately returned
to their stable home.239
Finally, advocates argue that courts must interpret the Child's
Objection Clause narrowly in order to protect the Hague Convention's
overall goals. 240 The treaty was never meant to determine the ultimate
custody or the child's best welfare, but was simply meant to return the
child to his home country for any later custodial determinations. By
allowing a liberal interpretation of this and other clauses, scholars argue
that courts would be ultimately determining eventual custody and
procedural matters that are best left to the domestic courts.24' In
addition, by allowing more complex and individualized rulings, judges
could create a long, drawn-out process and destroy the quick, efficient
return envisioned by Hague Convention drafters. For all these reasons,
many argue that the Child's Objection Clause should be strictly
interpreted to protect the main interests and goals of the Hague
242Convention on International Child Abduction.
237 id.
238 Id. See also Nanos, supra note 2, at 459 (arguing that a "narrow interpretation
of the Child's Objection Clause can assist in promoting stable familial
relationships and reducing psychological trauma which results when parents
abruptly uproot children and remove them to foreign lands").
2 3 9 id.
240 See Nanos, supra note 2, at 450 (arguing that proper decisions "tend to
maintain the narrow interpretation of the Child's Objection defense as
contemplated and encouraged by the framers of the Convention.").
241 Id.
242 Id.
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B. Policy Reasons Favoring a Liberal Interpretation
While the U.S. has traditionally followed a very strict
construction of Article 13(2),243 some commentators and experts have
argued that the courts should instead allow a more liberal interpretation
of this Clause.244 Many argue that both the changing state of the law and
the growth of children's rights require a broader reading of this Clause.245
In addition, the emerging picture of a typical abductor has differed
sharply from what Convention drafters expected; a difference which may
require a change in the way such cases are considered.246
1. Children's Rights under International Law
International law has changed and developed a great deal since
the Hague Convention treaty was signed in 1980. The area of
"children's rights," in particular, has grown and expanded considerably
in the past twenty years.247 While the law traditionally treated children
24as little more than their parents' property, 48 children are now recognized
as having individual human rights, including the right to self-
expression.249 For this reason, many believe that judicial interpretation
of the Hague Convention should reflect the growth in children's rights
and the need for children to have a voice in their future.25°
243 Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351 (stating that U.S. courts are unlikely to
defer to child's objection as a reason for denying a return).
244 See, e.g. Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications
of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction, 20 U. ILL. L. REv. 669, 672 (2001) (criticizing court's narrow
interpretation of defenses to return under the Hague Convention, and arguing for
a broader interpretation of treaty provisions to better protect the best interests of
abducted children).
245 Id.
246 See infra Part III(B)(2) for a discussion of the image of a typical abductor.
247 See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children 's Rights
in Judicial Custody and Visitation Decision-making, 36 FAM. L.Q. 105 (2002),
for a discussion of the changing and expanding role for children's rights,
particularly in the context of custody hearings.
248 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 342 (stating that historically, children were
considered personal property of their parents, as reflected in the legal history of
both U.S. and European law dating back to the Middle Ages).
249 BEAUMONT, supra note 4, at 177.
250 Id.
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In the field of international law, the concept of children's rights
first began developing during the twentieth century with agreements such
as the League of Nation's Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which
expressed the sentiment that "mankind owes to the child the best it has to
give. 251  In 1959, the United Nations enacted a second declaration,
which emphasized that children are entitled to basic human rights, such
as protection from neglect and cruelty,252 as well as adequate housing,
nutrition, and education.253 In addition, the treaty states that children are
entitled to "special protection," and that "the best interests of the child"
should be of "paramount importance. 254
These treaties show an increasing concern in international law
for children's interests, a concern which culminated with the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 55 This Convention establishes
international protection of the rights of children, and for the first time
creates principles binding upon signatory countries. 256 The Convention
on the Rights of the Child was unanimously adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1989 and has since been ratified by nearly every nation in
the world.257 The United States and Somalia are now the only two
258
nations that have not ratified the U.N. Convention.
The Rights of the Child Convention attempts to improve the
situation of children around the world, and recognize children's
fundamental human rights and freedoms. 259  The treaty, broadly
speaking, has four fundamental goals: the protection of children against
neglect and exploitation, the protection of children from harm, the
251 Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Progress and
Challenge, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHT[NG POVERTY 139, 140 (Summer 1998).
252 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of The Child 10
(1995). The Declaration incorporated ten human rights principles from the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed earlier in 1949. Id.
253 The Declaration, though influential, was not a binding treaty. Id.
254 Id.
255 Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 45 th Sess., 61st Plen.
Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) [Hereinafter U.N. Convention].
256 id.
257 Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 344.
258 Id.
259 Rios-Kohn, supra note 251, at 142.
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provision of assistance for their basic needs, and the participation of
children in decisions affecting their destiny.26 °
Thus, for the first time in international law, the treaty
261
expresses the principle that children have a right to freedom of
expression and assures that children have a voice in legal proceedings
and custody decisions that directly affect their interests.2 62 This final
objective is achieved through two provisions: Article 3, which
establishes that the best interests of children should be a primary
consideration in all actions concerning children, whether in courts of law
or other areas of government; 263 and Article 12, which establishes the
children's right to participate in all aspects of life within the community
and family.264
Article 12 provides a "child who is capable of forming his or her
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the
child. 2 65  This ensures that once a child is capable of forming an
opinion, she should always be given the opportunity to express that
opinion in legal proceedings that impact her.266 While a child's view
may not be conclusive, courts do have an obligation to hear and consider
that child's wishes.267
This goal, of allowing children a voice in the legal process, sets
up a potential collision course between the requirements of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Hague Convention.
Under the strict construction followed by U.S. courts, many children are
denied the right to voice their views and objections.268 While the U.N.
Convention requires consideration of all but the youngest infants' views,
Hague Convention proceedings conducted in the U.S. typically will
260 Id.
261 Van Bueren, supra note 252, at 131.
262 Id.
263 Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 345. While the treaty does not define "best
interests," this provision is one of the treaty's "core values," requiring
consideration of the child's best interest in all proceedings affecting a child. Id.
264 Rios-Kohn, supra note 251, at 143.
265 id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See supra Part I(B) (discussing narrow US interpretation of child's objection
clause).
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consider only "mature" adolescents' views. 269  Thus, the American
interpretation of "children's objections" seems to be in direct
contradiction with the principles of the Rights of the Child
Convention. 270 For this reason, many have argued that the U.S. must
adopt a more liberal construction of the Child's Objection Clause to
allow all children the right to express their views, and further children's
rights of free expression and participation.
2 71
Although the U.S. has not ratified the U.N. Convention, the
President did sign the original treaty.2 72 Because it was not ratified by
Congress, the treaty is not binding law in the U.S., but its widespread
acceptance and support lend the principles considerable persuasive
force.2 73 This acceptance means that even nations who have not ratified
the treaty may incorporate its principles. 74 Indeed, the universality of
these provisions may soon move the treaty into the arena of "customary"
international law, which is binding regardless of whether a country has
ratified the treaty.275
While U.S. judges may not be required to follow the U.N.
Convention's provisions,276 they still have the option (and many would
argue the obligation) to incorporate the treaty's principles when
considering cases involving and impacting a child. It seems clear that
the U.S. interpretation of "Child's Objections" is inconsistent with the
U.N. Convention's guarantee of children's participation and court
consideration of their views.2 77
269 See BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 178 ("Article 12 states that the views of a
child ... should always be given the opportunity to be heard, either directly or
indirectly, in proceedings impacting upon him or her.")
270 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351-53 (arguing that U.S. interpretation of
the "child's objection clause" is in direct contradiction to the principles of the
U.N. Rights of the Child Convention).
271 id.
272 Id.
273 See Rios-Kohn, supra note 251, at 156-57 (stating that the treaty has
considerable persuasive authority, and may be used as an aid to judicial
interpretation for other treaties or laws).
274 Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 346-47.
275 Id.
276 Id. U.S. courts are not required to follow the conventions of the treaty
because it has not yet been ratified, or made binding, in the United States. Id.
277 id.
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In general, international law has given increased recognition to
the children's needs and rights. The world and the state of international
law are vastly different now compared to the period when the Hague
Convention was signed over twenty years ago. For this reason, many
argue that courts should recognize the increased status of children's
rights in judicial rulings. 78
2. Domestic Violence
Many who have called for a more liberal interpretation of Article
13 defenses have criticized the treaty itself for failing to consider
significant issues. One problem commentators cite is disconnect
between the "typical" abductor contemplated by the Convention and the
type of person who actually does abduct a child.279 Specifically, the
drafters of the Hague Convention, and the U.S. Congress, failed to
consider situations in which the abductor is an abused spouse who flees
with her children to another country. In such scenarios, tension is
revealed between the Hague Convention's goal of ensuring the "prompt
return" of wrongfully removed children, 280 and the goal of ensuring
children's safety from harm.28'
While the Hague Convention itself does not posit a "typical"
abduction, the Explanatory Report includes a description of a
278 id.
279 Merle H. Wiemer, International Child Abduction and the Escape From
Domestic Violence, 69 Fordham L.Rev. 593, 599 (2000) (examining the general
perception when the Hague Convention was drafted that typical abductors were
men who feared losing custody to the children's mother, and the fact that
drafters failed to consider the possibility that the abducting parent could be a
victim fleeing domestic abuse ).
280 The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, Art. 1(a)
T.I.A.S. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter
referred to as the Hague Convention on Child Abduction] ("It is affirmed that
the Convention shall secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed
to, or retained in, any Contracting State.").
28 1 Hague Convention on Child Abduction, supra note 9, Preamble. ("Firmly
convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters
relating to their custody, Desiring to protect children internationally from the
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention...")
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"paradigmatic" abduction.282 It constructed a model of the typical
situation which provokes an abduction of a child.283 In this model, the
abductor is seen as a non-custodial parent who abducts the child due to
"diminished influence with the child, and frustration with custody
proceedings. 28 a The report, and the Convention itself, do not appear to
have considered situations in which the abductor is instead a spouse who
flees the country to escape domestic abuse.285
In popular U.S. media, the international child abductor was
typically portrayed as "a male non-custodial parent, usually a foreign
national, who removed the child from the child's mother and primary
caretaker, typically an American national. 286 When the U.S. adopted the
Hague Convention, Congressional hearings reveal a perceived
"prototype" of the international abductor.287 When urging ratification of
the Hague treaty, Representative Stark of California cited two cases that
were "paradigmatic" of international child abductions.288 In both cases, a
child was abducted by a male non-custodial parent to a foreign country
leaving behind an American mother.2 9 This image is depicted also in
news media, which most often features stories in which a left-behind
American mother searches for a child in a foreign country. 290 When
domestic violence was considered at the Congressional Hearing, it was
mentioned as a factor favoring return when a child is abducted by an
abusive parent. 9
282 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 243.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Wiemer, supra note 253 at 599 (2000)
286 Id. at 602. (citing the stereotyped image of international abductions expressed
in popular media during the 1970's to 1990's).
287 See Parental Kidnapping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice
of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 35 (1983) (Statement of
James G. Hergen, Assistant Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State).
288 Id.
289 id.
290 See "Mother Finds No Help For Child Held 'Hostage' In Iran", Seattle
Times, July 21, 1985, at A10 (telling plight of mother whose child was abducted
by her abusive husband to Iran).
291 See Parental Kidnapping.- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice
of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, supra note 287, at 166 (stating that
abducted children cannot be assumed to be safe because they are taken by their
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It is the disparity between this image of abusive abductors and
the reality of the numerous cases that involve an abused abductor and
child,292 that may contribute to some of the divergent rulings in U.S.
courts based on Children's Objections. U.S courts do not have a
framework with which to analyze cases involving an abductor fleeing an
abusive parent/spouse. Due to the lack of consideration of such cases in
the treaty creation or ratification phase, some courts incorporate a
broader interpretation of the Children's Objection and Grave Danger
clauses in order to prevent return in such cases.
This argument goes against all precedent for Hague Convention
cases. U.S. courts have repeatedly stated that such defenses must be
interpreted narrowly.293 The main purpose of the Convention is to ensure
swift return of the child,294 so that the abducting parent does not gain the
advantage of his home country's jurisdiction.2 95 In addition, the courts
don't want to reward the abductor, or encourage more kidnappings, by
allowing a child to stay with the abducting parent.296 For these reasons,
own parent, when the parent is abusive or alcoholic.); id. at 67 (implying that
abusive or drug-addicted parents are more likely to abduct a child before
custody is determined because of the low chance of obtaining custody legally).
292 See generally Merle H. Wiemer, International Child Abduction and the
Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 593, 599 (2000).
293 See Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1995) (" A respondent who
opposes the return of a child may advance any of the affirmative defenses to
return listed in Articles 12, 13, or 20 of the Hague Convention... We believe,
however, that a court applying the Hague Convention should construe these
exceptions narrowly." See also The International Child Abduction Remedies
Act, 42 USCS § 11601(a)(4) (2004) ("The [Hague] Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction ... establishes legal rights and
procedures for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed
or retained.... Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within the
meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow
exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.") [Ital. added].
294 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 30, at 429, para. 16.
295 Id.
296 See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2 nd Cir. 1999) ("Were a court to
give an overly broad construction to its authority to grant exceptions under the
Convention, it would frustrate a paramount purpose of that international
agreement-namely, to 'preserve the status quo and to deter parents from crossing
international boundaries in search of a more sympathetic court').
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U.S. courts have not conducted a deep inquiry into the child's best
interests in these types of cases.
Traditionally, U.S. courts have not allowed evidence of domestic
abuse against the abducting parent to be considered when deciding
whether a Child's Objection, or a grave risk of harm will prevent
297 298return. For example, in the case of Tabacchi v. Harrison, the court
held that the abducting parent had not proven a grave risk of harm to the
child, despite evidence that the left-behind parent had abused his spouse,
because sufficient evidence did not exist proving the child herself had
been abused.299 However, evidence suggests that courts are now giving a
much broader interpretation of these defenses in cases involving
domestic abuse.
To illustrate, the district court in the case of Blondin v. DuBois
300
appeared to go against precedent when it allowed a seven-year-old's
objection to be considered by the courts.3 ' However, this ruling
arguably represents the court's attempt to take domestic violence into
consideration when deciding Hague Convention petitions.
The domestic violence issue came up forcefully in Blondin. Ms.
Dubois removed her two children, seven-year-old Marie-Eline and two-
year-old Francois, from France and brought them to the United States,
without their father, Mr. Blondin's, permission or knowledge. 30 2 The
father, a French citizen, then petitioned U.S. courts to return his children
to France under the Hague Convention on International Abduction.30 3
Dubois raised a defense arguing that returning the children would expose
297 See Weiner, supra note 14, at 654 (stating that courts often view domestic
abuse against the parent as irrelevant to a determination of a "grave risk of
harm" under 13(b)).
298 Tabacchi v. Harrison, 99-C4130, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
8, 2000)
299 Id. at 1544. ("Since the burden is on respondent to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that an order returning Beatrice to Italy would present a
grave risk to the child, this absence of evidence must be construed against
defendant.")
300 Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2 Cir. 2001) ("Blondin III").
301 See id. at 166 (holding that court was correct in considering seven-year old's
objection, because it was not the sole basis for denying return of child to
petitioning parent).
302 Blondin v. Dubois, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123,124 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Blondin ").
303 Id.
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them to a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) of the Convention. °4
The U.S. District Court denied Blondin's petition, agreeing with Dubois,
the mother, and finding a grave risk of harm if the children were
returned.3 °5 The court relied on testimony that Blondin had repeatedly
abused and beat Dubois, often in the children's presence.30 6 Marie-Eline
testified that Blondin beat her and her brother, and had twisted an
electrical cord around her neck, threatening to kill both her and her
mother.30 7 She also stated that she did not want to return to France; the
court gave some weight to her objections, although it stated that her
objection was not dispositive.0 8
This decision prompted a flurry of appeals and remands. On
appeal, the decision of the district court was reversed and remanded by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 30 9 The Second Circuit argued that
the district court should have considered other alternatives to allow the
children to be returned to their home country's jurisdiction, without
putting them in the father's custody.310  The district court, after
considering whether such alternatives existed, decided that returning the
children to France would expose them to further psychological harm, and
that Marie-Eline's objection to leaving the United States should be
followed.311 In finding a grave risk of harm, the court relied on Marie-
Eline's testimony, as well as the expert witness's testimony that the
304 Id. at 128.
35 Id. at 127 ("I find, by clear and convincing evidence, that return of Marie-
Eline and Francois to France would present a 'grave risk' that they would be
exposed to 'physical or psychological harm' or that they would otherwise be
placed in an 'intolerable situation'.")
306 Id. at 124-26.
307 id.
308 Id. at 128-29.
309 Blondin, 189 F.3d at 241.
0 Id. at 242. ("While we agree with the District Court that the children should
not be returned to their home country in their father's custody, we nevertheless
conclude that the District Court should be given a further opportunity to
consider the availability of temporary arrangements that would honor the
Convention's mandate of delivering abducted children to the jurisdiction of the
courts of their home countries, while still protecting them from the 'grave risk'
of harm.)
"' Id. at 249
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children would suffer psychological harm and a recurrence of post-
traumatic stress symptoms if returned to France.'
This decision was appealed by the father, Blondin, on the
grounds that Marie-Eline was too young to have her views considered
when finding a grave risk of harm or a Child's Objection.313 The court
then decided that the child's view may be considered when deciding
whether a grave risk of harm exists if the child is returned. The child's
testimony only formed a part of the grounds for finding this separate
defense, thus courts may use a more liberal interpretation when
determining whether the child is of sufficient age and maturity.31 4 The
court did not rule on whether Marie-Eline was old enough to make an
official Child's Objection" to return under Article 13, but decided that
because a grave risk of harm had been found, the children would not be
returned to France.31 5 However, the court stated in dicta that Marie-
Eline's objection, taken alone, would also be sufficient to deny return
under the Child's Objection clause of Article 13.316
The Blondin case represents a turning point for U.S. courts. The
Second Circuit chose to give a much broader interpretation of the Child's
Objection and Grave Risk clauses, allowing the views of a much younger
child to be considered and heard when deciding whether a grave risk of
harm actually does exists. That decision allowed courts to make a more
in-depth analysis of the risks and possible harms children face if returned
to their home country.
This case was met with a flood of both praise and criticism.
Some commentators praised the decision as representing a step forward
312 id.
313 Blondin, 238 F.3d at 155 ("Blondin IV")
314 Id. at 166. ("We also agree with the government that a court may consider a
younger child's testimony as part of a broader analysis under Article 13(b). In
either case, of course, a court must take into account the child's age and degree
of maturity in considering how much weight to give its views. As the
government acknowledges, however, it stands to reason that the standard for
considering a child's testimony as one part of a broader analysis under Article
13(b) would not be as strict as the standard for relying solely on a child's
objections to deny repatriation under Article 13.")
315 id.
3 16 id.
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in protecting children's interests in cases involving domestic abuse.3 17
However, others criticized the court's reading as being unnecessarily
broad, and frustrating the main intent of the Hague Convention treaty:
the prompt return of abducted children. Some commentators also believe
that allowing such a loose interpretation in domestic abuse cases creates
uneven and disparate rulings which prevent the uniform application of
318the Hague Convention in U.S. courts.
Conversely, others argue that the unforeseen prevalence of
domestic violence in Hague parental abductions argues for a different,
more liberal interpretation of its provisions.319 One commentator argued
that courts should allow more weight to a child's objections when the
child voices a preference to remain with an abducting parent who has
been a domestic violence victim. 320 While courts are typically reluctant
to consider an objection if the child simply objects to returning to the
petitioning parent, or if they suspect parental influence, these approaches
may ultimately discount or dismiss the child's fear.32'
Often, a child who has witnessed or suffered violence by the petitioning
parent may object to return because he is afraid of that parent and wishes
317 See generally Peter Glass, Blondin v. DuBois: A Closer Step to Safeguarding
the Welfare of Children?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 723 (2000-2001).
318 See Merle H. Weimer, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and
Progress. the Need for Purposeful Analysis of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REv.
275, 338-339 (2002) ("Blondin IV, however is problematic. It makes Hague
Convention proceedings much more like custody contests, [and] dramatically
widens Article 13(b) defenses.... These aspects ... were unnecessary and are
contrary to the purposes that underlie the Convention.")
319 See generally Jeanine Lewis, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: When Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Impact the Goal of Comity, 13 TRANSNAT'L 391 (2000); Sharon Nelson,
Turning Our Backs on the Children. Implications of Recent Cases Regarding
the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L.REv.
669 (2001); Weiner, supra note 21 (outlining how strict interpretation of the
Convention can lead to unjust results in cases involving victims of domestic
violence, and arguing for a more liberal interpretation, and a separate legal
defense, in such cases).
320 Id. at 663.
321 See id. (arguing that the court's failure to consider the stated preference to
remain with one parent can limit the usefulness of the Children's Objection
clause for children who have been abused).
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to remain with the non-violent parent.322 However, the court will
traditionally have little regard for a child's simple preference to remain
with one parent.323 Thus, the narrow construction of the Children's
Objection clause would cause courts to dismiss possible valid fears of a
child who has suffered or witnessed domestic violence.
A child who has witnessed or suffered abuse may be unable or
unwilling to share the details of the abuse, or his or her fears.324 For this
reason, advocates have argued that courts should allow a child to state a
simple preference without additional explanations.325  When such a
preference is stated in a case involving credible allegations of abuse by
the left-behind parent, courts should give considerable weight to those
326
views.
To some extent, it seems that courts have already taken some of
these policy arguments into account. Considering U.S. rulings through
this lens helps to explain some of the divergent rulings amongst recent
cases. Many of the cases that allowed a lower age limit for considering a
Child's Objection involved a child who had suffered or witnessed alleged
domestic abuse.327
IV. Analysis of Case Law and Conclusion
By examining how U.S. courts have ruled in Hague Convention
cases, certain patterns emerge. One is the extreme reluctance of U.S.
courts to hear children's objections, while another is the lack of clear
analysis or precedent from these cases. First, examining the cases
reveals that children's objections, standing alone, will almost never
justify refusing to return the child. Only one case exists in which a
child's objection was the sole ground for refusing return. In this case,
322 Id.
323 See supra Part II(B)(2)(i), regarding court's general approach not to consider
'child's objections' based on that child's preference not to live with the
petitioning parent.
324 Lewis, supra note 330, at 664.
325 Id. at 664.
326 Id.
327 See generally Nelson, supra note 15, at 672 (2001) (criticizing court's narrow
interpretation of defenses to return under the Hague Convention, and arguing for
a broader interpretation of treaty provisions to better protect the best interests of
abducted children).
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the objecting child was fifteen years old.328 In all the other cases in
which judges allowed child's objections, the judge eventually refused
return based on other grounds, such as grave danger or settlement in a
new environment.329 Overall, judges are reluctant to give children's
objections real force in US courts but will be lenient in allowing such
objections if the return will be refused on other grounds.
This objective may help explain the varying rulings on the treaty
provision regarding age and maturity. In cases that also involve a valid
Article 13(b) defense, such as Blondin, judges are more willing to find a
Child's Objections as a separate ground, though the child may be only
eight. However, in cases such as England, which did not involve any
other defense, the judge refused the children's objection, even though the
child was thirteen.33° In a sense, it is a results-based jurisprudence.
Courts are reluctant to allow children's objections to have decisive force,
thereby holding these objections to a higher standard as a sole defense
than the standard employed if return is already refused on other grounds.
The real effect of this in U.S. courts is to make the Child's
Objection Clause moot. An objection by a child will almost never
change the outcome of the trial, but merely act as a second or third
ground for refusal of return. Thus, in a real sense, the cases have the
same result as if the Child's Objection Clause did not exist at all.
Without decisive force, the Clause becomes toothless, and, in a sense,
worthless.
The second main issue in the interpretation of the Clause is the
lack of analysis employed by U.S. courts. The U.S. courts have not
created a consistent framework for consideration or analysis of children's
objections, but instead employ a fact-specific approach. Often, judicial
opinions merely contain a conclusory statement that the objection is not
328 See In the Matter of L.L. (Children), (N.Y. Fain. Ct. May 22, 2000)
(www.incadat.com, The Hague Conference on Private International Law,
The International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT)) (last visited Sept. 30,
2005); See also BEAUMONT, supra note 5, at 184 n.60 (noting that the authors
had only found one unpublished case in which U.S. courts denied a child's
return based on Art. 13(2)).
329 See, e.g., Blondin,, 189 F.3d 240 and Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F.
Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
330 See England, supra note 176.
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allowed, without including any analysis as to why.33 1 This lack of
analysis contributes to the problem of inconsistent and varying rulings
issued by the U.S. courts.332 Quite simply, the courts have no consistent
approach, and thus do not achieve consistent results.
While the U.S. approach has arguably contradicted the intended
purpose and effect of the Child's Objection Clause by rarely allowing
such objections, it seems that always allowing such objections to carry
weight would also contradict the drafters' intent. In Germany and
Austria, for example, courts have almost always prevented return when a
child objects, regardless of the child's age, maturity, or reason for
objecting.333 This extremely loose interpretation of the Clause has led
some parental rights advocates to charge that the German approach hurts
the families' interests and that the courts are actually twisting the Child's
Objection Clause to allow German abducting parents to keep the
abducted child. 334 As the plight of Lady Catherine Meyer shows,3 35 an
overly liberal interpretation of the Child's Objection Clause creates its
own risk of injustice.
Children's objections raise many complex social, psychological,
and legal issues and judges are asked to weigh a finely balanced mix of
policy issues both for and against these objections. Therefore, courts
should employ a balancing test that would allow it to more effectively
and consistently weigh and analyze these issues. Other country's
approaches can help in formulating such a framework for analysis.
However, most other signatories to the Hague Convention are civil law
countries, and therefore their approach may be less relevant and
applicable to U.S. courts. Alternatively, other common law systems
offer valuable approaches. The United Kingdom's approach to weighing
331 Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 351 ( "In the U.S., analysis under the child's
objection exception is fairly straightforward - for the most part, it does not
exist.").
332 See supra Part 11 (B) for a discussion of conflicting case rulings in the United
States.
333 See, e. g. Thomas A. Johnson, The Hague Abduction Convention:
Diminishing Returns and Little to Celebrate for Americans, 33 N.Y.U. J.INT.
LAW & POL 125, 147 (2000-2001) ("These countries, such as Austria, Germany
and Sweden, have made the Child Abduction Convention an instrument for
ensuring the success of their abductors...").
334 Id.
331 Supra Part II.
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an objection by an abducted child may offer a useful template for the
United States.
In the United Kingdom, judges who weigh a Child's Objection
use a much more involved process.336 First, judges consider a set of
specific factors that outlines the most important issues involved in a
Child's Objection case under the Hague Convention. Next, the courts use
specific methods and questions to determine a child's "age and
maturity." Finally, the British courts have created guidelines to aid a
judge in determining when an objection is valid, and when it is
appropriate for a judge to use his discretion to refuse return.
Hague Convention cases are relatively uncommon, and many
judges will rarely, if ever, hear such a case. Given the complexity of
these cases, and the general lack of experience in this area, it becomes
even more important for judges to have a set of specific factors and
analytical frameworks to help guide their decision-making. In the
seminal case of In re S, the British court listed several general factors for
ajudge to consider in deciding how to rule on Children's Objections.337
First, the court emphasized that a Child's Objection is a separate
and independent ground for refusing return; and that it does not require
that the child would face a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation
if returned. 338 This approach ensures that Children's Objections are
given the intended force as an independent ground for refusing removal,
in sharp contrast to the U.S. approach, which often conflates this clause
with the grave risk of harm requirement.339
Next, the questions of whether a child objects, or is of sufficient
maturity to object, remain questions of fact to be decided by the trial
judge.340 In addition, the judge is usually expected to find out why the
child is objecting to return - if the child simply wishes to remain with the
abducting parent, this fact may weigh against allowing the objection
when the judge decides to use his discretion.341 Furthermore, the court
336 See generally Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 355-62. (examining in-depth
British analysis of Child's Objections in Hague Convention cases).
337 See In re S [1993] Fain at 242. (This case is considered to contain the classic
identification of principles to be applied in a Hague Abduction case).
338 Id.
339 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 344-46.
340 In re S, supra note 336.
341 Id.
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emphasizes that there is no minimum age requirement for raising a
Child's Objection. (In the In Re S case itself, a nine-year-old child raised
a successful objection; and English courts have been willing to at times
allow objections by children as young as seven). If the court comes to
the conclusion that the child's views have been influenced by the
abducting parent, or the child simply wishes to remain with that parent,
the objection will be given little weight. However, if the court finds that
the child has valid reasons for her objection, the court may refuse to
order the return.
Finally, the court reiterated that a court should only refuse to
order a child's return in exceptional circumstances.342 These factors
ensure that judges are presented with most of the important issues
involved - this is especially important given the fact that most judges do
not have a great deal of experience with Hague cases, and are not
specialists in this area of the law.
Once the objection is raised, British courts have a specific
analytical framework that guides how such objections should be
considered by the court. In the case of In Re S, the British courts created
a defined framework for considering Article 13 objections that allows a
step-by-step consideration of the issues involved.3 43  First, the court
determines whether the child is of sufficient "age and maturity" to
object; then whether the court should use its discretion to allow that
objection to prevent the child's return. 344
First, the courts assume there is no threshold age for invoking a
Child's Objection, but hold that the younger the child is, the less likely
that child will have the requisite age and maturity to raise a valid
objection under the Hague Convention.345 Second, in order to determine
a child's maturity, the court appoints a child welfare officer to interview
the child and make a finding; the court then uses its own test to decide if
the child is sufficiently mature to object. However, the judge retains
discretion, and may refuse an objection, even if the welfare officer finds
sufficient age and maturity.346
342 id.
343 In re S (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody rights), [1993] Fam 242 (Eng.)
344 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 358.
345 d.
346 See generally Kenworthy, supra note 16.
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When deciding the difficult question of when a child is
"sufficiently mature" to raise an valid objection, British courts have
framed the question in this manner: A child will be deemed sufficiently
mature if the child has reached the point of development at which, when
asked "do you object to a return to your home country?" that child can
give an answer based not on instinct alone, but based on a discernment of
that question's implications for his best interests in the long and short
term.347 Under this approach, maturity isn't assumed based simply on
age. Although in general, the younger the child is, the less likely the
child will be found sufficiently mature; however, the court will rely on
the testimony of child welfare officers, and the child's own answers
rather than making an automatic assumption that the child lacks
maturity. 3
48
First, the court welfare officer ensures that a child is at least
afforded the opportunity to have his or her voice heard. Any child
objecting to return has the opportunity to speak to a court officer; it is
then the court's decision whether that objection should be dispositive.
Regardless of what a judge decides, this system helps to ensure that the
judge has an adequate factual basis for their decision, based on the
child's statements to the court. In addition, this process allows other
issues, such as domestic violence, to be factored into the court's decision,
in case the issue is influencing the child's objection to return. In
contrast, the US approach allows judges to decline to even hear a child's
objection if that judge feels that the child is not sufficiently mature.349
Britain's split approach prevents conclusory rulings by allowing the
objection, thus giving the judge the opportunity to investigate before
making a decision on the level of maturity of the objecting child. This
approach ensures that children at least have an opportunity for their
objection to be heard and avoids situations like that in Tahan, where the
court refused to even hear that child's objection based on a blanket
statement that a nine-year old lacks maturity.35 °
In addition, this approach is more consistent with the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which guarantees children a right
347 See Re S (minors) (abduction: acquiescence) [1994] 2 F.C.R. 945, 954
(India).
348 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 358.
349 See, e.g. Tahan, 613 A.2d at 486, supra note 159.
350 Id.
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to be heard in all matters affecting the child."' As in the UN
Convention, the amount of weight given to that view may vary based on
the child's age and experience, but the child at least has an opportunity to
express his wishes. This approach is consistent with the UN Convention
that seeks to allow children the freedom to speak and have their wishes
considered by the courts; and stands in contrast to the strict US approach
that often denies children the opportunity to even express that view.
Finally, even after a judge finds the child is "sufficiently mature"
to raise a valid objection, the judge must decide if that objection should
prevent the child's return. Even if the judge decides that the child has
objected to return, and is sufficiently mature to raise such an objection,
the judge still has discretion to order the child's return in spite of that
objection.352 After the court determines that the child is of the necessary
age and maturity to raise an objection, this only "unlocks the door" to
allow the judge to exercise his discretion and decline to return the child.
The Child's Objection Clause is not compulsory; under the Hague
Convention, judges retain the ultimate discretion to decide whether a
valid child's objection should prevent return. Because the decision to
accept or reject a Child's Objection is discretionary, it is sometimes
unclear when it is appropriate for a court to take such objections into
account.
In English cases, courts have also listed principles to guide
judges in deciding when a valid child's objection should prevent
return.3 53 First, the court examines what the child's own self-perception
is: What does the child believe is in her best interests? 354 Second, the
court examines to what extent the child's reason for objection is rooted in
reality, or reasonably appears to the child to be grounded in reality.
355
Third, the court ascertains to what extent the child's views have been
influenced or shaped by pressure from the abducting parent. Finally, the
court examines whether these objections could be mollified upon return
(for example, by removing the child from the influence of an abducting
351 U.N. Convention, supra note 247.
352 Id.
353 See Re T (Abduction: Child's Objection to Return) [2000] 2 F.L.R. 192, 204
(India).
354 Id.
355 id.
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parent).356 This approach allows judges to weigh many of the most
important policy reasons for following, or not following, a child's
objection.
This second test allows judges to use their discretion when
deciding whether to prevent return based on an objection, but also creates
a guide for judges to use when making that decision. In addition, it also
allows for consideration of many of the policy issues underlying parental
abductions. By examining how much of the child's objection is rooted in
reality, judges can consider whether domestic abuse, bad conditions or
actual mistreatment by the petitioning parent is motivating the objection.
Conversely, judges can also consider whether it is in fact the abducting
parent's influence or wishes that are really motivating the objection.
Under this approach, judges investigate, to an extent, the reason for the
child's objection, allowing the court to learn of possible instances of
abuse that could remain unseen under the stricter U.S. approach.
The main difference between U.S. and British courts may not
necessarily be the end result, but the means used to reach that end. The
British system has created a specific system for weighing Child
Objections that allow children a greater opportunity to raise their views,
and a greater opportunity for courts to fully consider the many factors
involved and reach more consistent results.
The English approach therefore offers a useful template for how
children's objections may be, or should be, considered by U.S. courts.
The United States also follows common-law principles. Thus, judicial
analysis and tests employed in one case can form precedent for courts to
follow in other similar cases. The analytical process outlined above could
also be employed in U.S. judicial rulings. First, a list of factors could be
outlined for courts to consider in Child's Objection cases. Second, the
courts could use a specific test to determine a child's maturity, the
qualities of a valid objection, and when a judge should use her discretion
to deny return. While the British approach offers a possible example of
what these tests should be, perhaps the most important point is that a test
is used at all. The use of a specific analytical framework reduces the
arbitrariness of judicial rulings, and creates more uniform and well-
explained results.
Overall, the British system offers a useful approach to weighing
a Child's Objections, an approach that could also be adopted by U.S.
356 Id.
VOL. 13
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courts. By employing a similar analytical framework, U.S. courts can
conduct more evaluative and consistent rulings. The British approach
has a number of advantages. First, it employs a fairly uniform process
for considering children's views through a welfare officer, as opposed to
the varying methods employed in US courts.35 7 Second, it offers a
framework for analyzing and weighing Child Objections.5 8 Under the
British approach if a child has the requisite age and maturity to object,
while weighing the policy objectives involved, the court then decides
whether to use its discretion to prevent the child from being returned.
Judges are able to consider policy issues such as parental influence or
domestic abuse within a wider context. This approach ensures that
judges consider and are aware of the many factors that must be weighed
in such a decision.
However, while the British approach offers more consideration
of a child's view, it does not act to automatically prevent return, as courts
in other countries have done. A child's view will not prevail if the child
lacks maturity, or the court decides that policy reasons outweigh the
child's objection. This approach allows courts to avoid the possible
abuse and weakening of the Clause that could result from an overbroad
interpretation, while still allowing children's objections to have real
force. The balancing approach, in essence, avoids many of the possible
problems that may result from both an overly liberal interpretation (as in
Germany) and an overly strict interpretation (as in the U.S.). In place of
the conclusory rulings and strict interpretation employed by the U.S.
courts, a more in-depth framework could lead to more just results. By
having a systematic analysis, the courts can better justify and explain the
results they reached, and create precedent for future rulings. Finally,
having a more involved system helps to ensure that justice is done, by
helping to ensure that the child's interests are truly considered and
weighed by the courts. Only by having a set framework for analysis, can
courts fully consider the policy objectives involved and decide on a more
conservative or liberal interpretation of the Children's Objection Clause.
This will avoid the results-based opinions often made in U.S. courts and
allow for a more evaluative consideration of all the interests involved.
Finally, it ensures that all children at least have the opportunity and right
357 See Kenworthy, supra note 16, at 359 ("To determine whether the child is old
enough or mature enough, the U.K. employs the use of a court welfare officer.")
358 Id.
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to participate and raise an objection, whether that objection is actually
conclusive or not.
By employing a systematic framework for analysis of Child
Objections under the Hague Convention, U.S. courts can fully weigh and
consider the child's views. Instead of reaching results based on the
presence of other defenses, the courts will base their opinion on the
merits of the objection itself. In conclusion, by employing a more in-
depth analysis, U.S. courts can revitalize this clause and provide children
with a forum for their voices to be heard and valued in Hague
Convention proceedings.
